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This paper estimates the welfare cost of bank capital requirements and 
finds that the macroeconomic stakes involved with the design of capital 
adequacy regulation are potentially large. A general equilibrium model 
with capital accumulation and a preference for liquidity is developed. 
Banks provide liquidity services by accepting deposits. A capital 
requirement plays a role, as it limits the moral hazard on the part of 
banks that is induced by the presence of a deposit insurance scheme. 
However, ceteris paribus, a higher capital requirement implies that banks 
can accept fewer deposits and thus provide fewer liquidity services to 
households. It is shown that equilibrium asset returns reveal the strength 
of households’ preferences for liquidity and this allows the derivation of 
a formula for the welfare cost of capital requirements that is a function 
only of observable variables. Using U.S. banking data, the cost of 
increasing the capital requirement by 10 percentage points is equivalent 
to a permanent loss in consumption of at least 0.1 to 0.2 percent. 
                                                 
1 Finance Department, Wharton School, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA. Email: 
vdheuvel@wharton.upenn.edu. The author has benefited from helpful comments from Andy Abel, 
Joao Gomes, Gary Gorton and seminar participants at Wharton and the Federal Reserve Board. All 
mistakes are mine.   This paper asks, and provides an answer to, the following question: How 
large are the welfare costs of bank capital requirements? While there are a number 
of papers on the theoretical benefits  of capital adequacy regulation, based on 
limiting the moral hazard involved with deposit insurance
2 or externalities 
associated with bank failures, much less is known about whether there are also 
costs involved with imposing restrictions on the capital structure of banks. Recent 
work by Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Gorton and Winton (2000), among 
others, suggests that capital requirements may have an important cost in that they 
reduce the ability of banks to create liquidity by accepting deposits. After all, a 
capital requirement limits the fraction of bank assets that can be financed by 
issuing deposit-type liabilities. Unfortunately, the models in these papers do not 
easily lend themselves to a quantification of this cost. 
  This paper’s contribution is to model the benefit of liquidity creation in a 
flexible way, embed the role of liquidity creating banks in an otherwise standard 
general equilibrium growth model, and use that framework to quantify the welfare 
cost of increasing the capital requirement. This cost depends crucially on 
households’ preferences for liquidity. A key insight from the model is that 
equilibrium asset returns reveal the strength of these preferences for liquidity and 
this allows us to quantify the welfare cost. The model also incorporates a rationale 
for the existence of capital adequacy regulation, based on a moral hazard problem 
associated with deposit insurance. The resulting benefits are characterized, but are 
harder to quantify. 
  In many countries capital adequacy regulation is currently based on the 
Basel Accords. In response to perceived shortcomings in the original Accord, 
practitioners have added more and more detailed refinements, culminating in the 
soon-to-be implemented Basel 2, while attempting to keep the required ratio of 
capital to risk weighted assets for a typical bank approximately the same. But is 
the 8% of the original Basle Accord a good number for the total risk-based capital 
ratio? This fundamental question remains unaddressed in the literature. At the 
same time the changes involved in Basel 2 seem likely to greatly increase the cost 
of compliance and supervision of banks.  
If we find that the welfare cost of capital requirements are trivial, this 
could be an argument for creating a simple, robust system of capital adequacy 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993) and Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1994). See Allen and Gale (2003) for a more skeptical view. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is often 
viewed as a theoretical justification for deposit insurance. 
  2regulation, with low compliance and supervision costs, but with relatively high 
capital ratios so as to make bank failure a sufficiently infrequent event. On the 
other hand, if we find a high welfare cost of capital requirements, this could be an 
argument for lowering them, by either accepting a higher chance of bank failure, 
or by designing a more risk-sensitive system with the associated increased 
supervision and compliance costs, which seems to be the trend in practice.  
 
1. The model 
 
  The most important respect in which the model deviates from the standard 
growth model is that households have a need for liquidity, and that certain agents, 
called banks, are able to create financial assets, called deposits, which provide 
liquidity services. Since a central goal of the model is to provide a framework not 
just for illustrating, but for actually measuring the welfare cost of capital 
requirements, it is important to model the preferences for liquidity in a way that is 
not too restrictive. In as much as possible, we would like the data to provide the 
answer, not the specific modeling choices. To that end, I follow Sidrauski (1967) 
in adopting the modeling device of putting liquidity services in the utility 
function. This has two disadvantages and one advantage.  
One disadvantage is that it does not further our understanding of why 
households like liquid assets, but this is not the topic of this paper, so this concern 
can be dismissed.
3 A second disadvantage is that if one needs to specify a 
particular functional form for the utility function, one is on loose grounds. For 
example, is the marginal utility of consumption increasing or decreasing in 
deposits?  
Fortunately – and this is the advantage of this approach – there is no need 
to make unpalatable assumptions of this kind. I will show that it is possible to 
derive a first-order approximation the welfare cost of raising the capital 
requirement without making any assumptions on the functional form of the utility 
function, beyond the standard assumptions that it is increasing and concave. A 
trade-off involved with modeling liquidity in this flexible way, and embedding it 
in a general equilibrium analysis, is that the modeling of the banks’ assets is not 
rich enough to incorporate the details of risk-based capital requirements. 
                                                 
3 Nonetheless, see Feenstra (1986) for how optimizing models of money demand based on a 
Baumol Tobin transaction technology can be approximately rewritten as maximization problems 
with money in the utility function.  
  3 
The environment and the agents’ decision problems 
 
  Time is discrete and there are infinitely many periods. The economy 
consists of households, banks, (nonfinancial) firms, and a government or 
regulatory agent. Households own both the banks and the nonfinancial firms. 
These firms combine capital and labor to produce the single good which 
households consume. I now discuss the assumptions for each of these agents, and 
analyze their decision problems in turn.  
 
Households: There is a continuum of households with mass one. Households are 
infinitely lived dynasties and have identical preferences. They value consumption 
and liquidity services. Households can obtain these liquidity services by 
allocating some of their wealth to bank deposits, an asset created by banks for this 
purpose. As mentioned, the liquidity services of bank deposits are modeled by 
assuming that the household’s utility function is increasing in the amount of 
deposits.  
  Besides holding bank deposits, denoted dt, households can store their 
wealth by buying and selling shares, or equity, et. They supply a fixed quantity of 
labor, normalized to one, for a wage, wt. Taxes are lump-sum and equal to Tt. 
There is no aggregate uncertainty, so the representative household’s problem is 
one of perfect foresight: 
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where ct is consumption in period t, 
D
t R  is the return on bank deposits, 
E
t R  is the 
return on (bank or firm) equity, and β is the subjective discount factor. The 
returns 
D
t R  and 
E
t R , and the wage are determined competitively, so the household 
takes these as given. The same applies for the taxes. There is no distinction 
between bank and nonbank equity, since, in the absence of risk, they are perfect 
  4substitutes for the household and will thus also command the same return. The 
second constraint is a no-Ponzi game condition, the third an initial condition.  
  The utility function is assumed to be concave, at least once continuously 
differentiable on   and increasing on its domain in both arguments, and strictly 
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  The first-order conditions to the household’s problem are: 
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where  λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the intertemporal budget 
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Equation (2), which determines the return on equity, is the standard Euler 
equation for the intertemporal consumption-saving choice in a deterministic 
setting, with one difference: the marginal utility of consumption may depend on 
the level of deposits. Equation (3) relates the spread between the return on equity 
and the return on bank deposits to the marginal value of the liquidity services 
provided by deposits, expressed in units of the consumption good. If  , 
then the return on equity will be higher than the return on deposits to compensate 
for the fact that equity does not provide any liquidity services. 
( , ) 0 d uc d>
 
Banks: There is a continuum of banks with mass one, which make loans to 
nonfinancial firms and finance these loans by accepting deposits from households 
and issuing equity. The ability of banks to create liquidity through deposit 
contracts is their defining feature. All contracts are resolved in one period. Every 
period new banks are setup with free entry into banking. The balance sheet, and 
the notation, for the representative bank during period t is: 
  5 
Assets Liabilities 
Lt   Loans  Dt   Deposits 
  Et   Equity 
 
Banks are subject to regulation, as well as supervision, by the government. One 
form of regulation is deposit insurance. If a bank fails, the government (through a 
deposit insurance fund) ensures that no depositor suffers a loss as a consequence 
of this failure. That is, all deposits are fully insured. Equity holders, as residual 
claimants, are left with nothing in the event of failure. The rationale for the 
deposit insurance is left unmodeled. However, it can be argued that deposit 
insurance improves the ability of banks to create liquidity.
4
  Secondly, banks face a capital requirement, which requires them to have a 
minimum amount of equity as a fraction of (risk-weighted) assets. Since loans are 
the only type of asset in this model, the capital requirement simply states that 
equity needs be at least a fraction γ of loans for a bank to be able to operate: 
 
  tt EL γ ≥  
 
For the moment, the capital requirement is merely assumed. It will later be shown 
how it can be socially desirable to have such a requirement, as it mitigates the 
moral hazard problem that arises due to the presence of deposit insurance.  
  The bank can make loans to nonfinancial firms, described below. These 
loans are riskless
5 and yield a rate of return 
L
t R . 
L
t R  is determined competitively in 
equilibrium, so each bank takes it as given. Thus, a bank that lends out Lt units of 
the good at the beginning of the period will receive nonrandom total return of 
L
tt R L  units at the end of the period. 
  The presence of deposit insurance creates a moral hazard problem: the 
bank has an incentive to engage in excessive risk-taking. Since this is the 
justification for the capital requirement, I introduce a way for the bank to engage 
in excessive risk-taking by assuming that the bank has the option of artificially 
raising the riskiness of its assets. Specifically, by lending to a different set of 
                                                 
4 Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide a model of panic based bank runs, which can be seen as a 
rationale for deposit insurance.  
5 The assertion that the bank can make riskless loans is a consequence of the technology of the 
nonfinancial firms, as detailed below.  
  6nonfinancial firms with a risky technology,
6 the bank can create a loan portfolio 
with riskiness σ that pays off 
L
tt R t σ ε + , where εt is a bank-specific shock with the 
following distribution: 
 
   (4) 
1  with probability 0.5






where ξ is a positive constant. It is assumed that the bank can choose the riskiness 
of its loans, though there is an upper bound:  [0, ] t σ σ ∈ .
7 The variance of the 
return is 
2 (1 ) t
2 σ ξ + , which is increasing in σt, and its expected value is 
L
tt R σ ξ − , 
which is decreasing in σt. It is in this sense that risk-taking is excessive: absent a 
moral hazard problem due to deposit insurance, the bank would always choose 
0 t σ = .  
  I am now in a position to state the bank’s problem. The objective of the 
bank is to maximize shareholder value by deciding how many loans to make, and 
how much risk to take on, and how to finance its assets with equity and deposits. 
Although the decision on how much equity to issue will be endogenized, it is 
convenient to first analyze the sub-problem of maximizing shareholder value right 
after the equity has been issued and the bank has raised Et in equity at the 
























The notation ( ) x
+ stands for max( ,0) x  and   is the expectations operator. The 
first constraint is the balance sheet identity, the second is the capital requirement, 
and the third bounds σ. 
E
 The  term  ( )
LD R LR D σε +− is the bank’s net cash flow at the end of the 
period. It consists of interest income from loans, minus any possible charge-offs 
on the loans, and minus the interest owed to depositors.  If the net cash-flow is 
positive, shareholders are paid the full amount in dividends. If the net cash flow is 
                                                 
6 Again, the technology will be described below and will be consistent with the rates of return 
assumptions made here. 
7 The reason for the existence of an upper bound is provided in the discussion of the government. 
8 In what follows, time subscripts will be used only where necessary to avoid confusion. 
  7negative, the bank fails and the deposit insurance fund must cover the difference 
in order to indemnify depositors, as limited liability of shareholders rules out 
negative dividends. Shareholders receive zero in this event, so dividends equal 
() ()
LD R LR D σε
+
+− .  
  At the beginning of period t shareholders discount the value of dividends, 
which are paid at the end of that period, by their opportunity cost of holding this 
particular bank’s equity. This opportunity cost is R
E, the market rate of return on 
equity. Because dividends are either not subject to risk, or, if  0 σ > , their risk is 
perfectly diversifiable, shareholders do not price the bank’s risk.
9
  First, I characterize the choice of σ conditional on L and D. Note that 
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Expected dividends are thus strictly decreasing in σ for low values of σ and 
strictly increasing in σ for sufficiently high values of σ. 
10 The reason is that for 
high values of σ, if the bank suffers a negative shock, there is not enough equity 
to absorb the loss and the excess loss is covered by the deposit insurance fund. 
Increasing risk further at this point increases the payoff to shareholders in the 
good state (ε = 1) without lowering it in the bad state. In other words, the value of 
the put option associated with the deposit insurance fund increases with σ. In 
contrast, when σ is low, the value of this put option is zero and shareholders fully 
take into account the reduction in net present value that occurs when risk is 
increased.  
  Because expected dividends are a convex function of σ, there are only two 
values to consider for the optimal choice of riskiness:  0 σ =  or σ σ = . It is easy 
to show that 
 
  0  iff   ( / )
LD R RD L σσ =≤ −  
 otherwise σ σ =
11
                                                 
0 D
9 Hence, the treatment of R
E as nonstochastic in the household problem is still correct, since, even 
if banks are risky, households would not leave any such risk undiversified. 
10 Note that there is no discontinuity at (( 1 2 ) )
LD RL R σξ − +− = .  
11 When  (/)
LD RR D L σ =− , the bank is indifferent between the two choices. For convenience, it 
is assumed that the bank chooses σ = 0 in that case. 
  8 
Because ELD L γ =−≥ , the following is a sufficient condition for  0 σ = :  
 
(1 )
LD RR σ γ ≤− −  (6) 
 
This is also a necessary condition when the capital requirement is binding. From 
now on, unless explicitly stated otherwise, it is assumed that (6) holds.  
  The bank’s sub-problem in (5) now simplifies to: 
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The first-order conditions are easily simplified to 
 
 
LD E R RR γ χ −=  
 
 where χ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the capital requirement: 
0 χ ≥  and  () EL0 χ γ −= . The existence of a (finite) solution requires 
LD R R ≥ . 
Under that condition, the solution is 
 
  ()
1 () ( 1 ) ( )






The capital requirement binds if and only if 
L R R > .  The interpretation is 
straightforward: an extra unit of equity can be lent out at the rate R
L. In addition, 
the extra unit of capital allows the bank to make 
1 ( γ
− 1 ) −  additional loans and 
finance those with deposits, without violating the capital requirement, which 
requires  . If 
1 L γ
− ≤ E
D L R R > , the second option has value, and the capital 
requirement will be binding, otherwise not. 
  I can now turn to the bank’s decision on how much equity to raise. The 
pre-issue value of the bank is  ( )
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Since we have already established that 
L R R ≥  is necessary for a solution to 
exist and that the capital requirement binds if and only if 
LD R R > , we can 
distinguish two cases: 
 
1.  If 
LD R R = , the capital requirement is slack and  
 
 
ELD R RR == (8) 
 
2.  If 
LD R R > , the capital requirement is binding, so EL γ = , and 
 
 (1 )
LD E R RR γ γ =− +  (9) 
 
In either case,  .  ( ) 0
B VE E −=
 
In the case of a binding capital requirement, one unit of lending is financed by γ in 
equity and (1-γ) in deposits, so for zero profits the rate of return to lending better 
equal the similarly weighted average of the required rates of return of equity and 
deposits, which is what is stated in (9).  
  Note that the sufficient condition for σ = 0 to be optimal, given in (6), is 
seen to be equivalent to 
 
 
E R σ γ ≤  (10) 
 
Again, this condition is also necessary if the capital requirement is binding. 
 
Firms: Nonfinancial firms cannot create liquidity through deposits. They can, 
however, buy goods to use them as capital, which can be combined with labor 
input, to produce output of the good. Capital is purchased at the beginning of the 
period. To finance their capital stock, firms can issue equity to households, 
                                                 
12 As is common in problems with constant returns to scale, the first order condition, rather than 
fully determining the agent’s choice, has the interpretation of a necessary condition for the 
existence of a finite solution. If 
1 () ( 1 ) ( )
E LL RR R R γ
− <> + − −
D , then E tends to plus (minus) 
infinity. If the first-order condition holds, E is indeterminate, and thus so is the scale of the bank.  
  10borrow from banks, or some combination of both. The firm’s balance sheet, and 
notation, for period t is: 
 
Assets Liabilities 
Kt   Physical Capital   Lt   Loans 
 
F
t E   Firm Equity 
 
There is a continuum of firms with mass normalized to one. Firms can employ a 
riskless or a risky production technology. The riskless technology is standard.
13 
Output in period t is  , where H ( , ) tt FK H t is hours of labor input and F( ) is a 
well-behaved production function exhibiting constant returns to scale. A fraction 
δ of the capital stock depreciates during the period. There are no adjustment costs. 
The absence of adjustment costs implies that firm’s problem is static. 
  As in the analysis of the bank’s problem, it is convenient to start with the 
firm’s decision problem right after it has raised  in equity. At that point the 





, () m a x( , ) ( 1) ( ) /
FF L F
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E
E
                                                
 
 
Here I have substituted out loans using the balance sheet identity.
14 The first-order 
conditions for the choices of capital and labor inputs are standard: 
 
(H)   (11)  ( , ) H FK H w =
 
(K)   (12)  (,)( 1 )
L
K FK H R δ +− =
 
These optimality conditions, together with the constant returns to scale 
assumption, imply that the solution for the firm’s shareholder value is: 
.  The pre-issue value of the firm is  . The 
firm maximizes this value when choosing E
() ( ) /
FF L F VE R E R = ( )
FF F VE E −
F. It is assumed that equity cannot be 
negative. 
 
13 It would be straightforward to let both types of firms have risky production, and therefore, risky 
loans to individual firms even while keeping σ = 0 as feasible for banks, as long as the production 
shocks are sufficiently imperfectly correlated across firms, so that the risk is perfectly diversifiable 
by lending to many firms. Excessive risk taking would then correspond to not diversifying this 
risk. 
14 Note that the absence of arbitrage opportunities implies that nonfinancial firms have to offer 
shareholders the same return on equity as banks, since there is no aggregate risk. 















EL RRµ =+  
 
where µ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the constraint that firm 
equity cannot be less than zero ( 0 µ ≥ , 0
F E µ = ).
15 A finite solution requires 
LE R R ≤ .  
If 
LE R R < , then E
F = 0, so K = L. In other words, if bank loans are 
cheaper than equity finance, the firm chooses to use only bank loans to finance its 
capital. If 
EL R R = , the firm’s financial structure is not determined by individual 
optimality. In either case economic profits, π
F, equal zero. 
  Which case applies turns out to depend on whether or not the demand for 
liquidity is satiated. To see this, recall that the analysis of the household’s 
problem established that the required rate of return for risk-free equity is higher 
than the required rate of return for bank deposits: 
D E R R ≤  (see equations (2) and 
(3)). Moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if the households’ demand for 
liquidity is nonsatiated. From the bank’s problem we know that 
(1 )
LD E R RR γ γ =− + .
16 It follows that, in fact,  
 
 
LE R R ≤  
 
and that this inequality is strict if and only if the households’ demand for liquidity 
is nonsatiated.  
Hence, as long as liquidity preference is not satiated, nonfinancial firms 
finance all their capital stock with the cheaper bank loans, rather than equity.
17 If 
instead the demand for liquidity is satiated ( ( , ) 0 d uc d= ), firms are indifferent 
between the two forms of finance. For this less interesting case, I assume without 
loss of generality that firms still opt for bank loans only.
18
                                                 
15 Technically, µ is the multiplier to that constraint after rescaling the problem by R
E, a constant to 
the firm. 
16 Note that this is true whether the capital requirement slack or binding. 
17 With the risk free technology there are no costs of bankruptcy or financial distress. 
18 This assumption is made for convenience and is without loss of generality in the sense that it has 
no effect on the model’s predictions for any equilibrium rates of return or the paths of 
consumption and capital accumulation. 
  12  In addition to this riskless technology, firms can also employ a risky 
technology. Risky firms provide a vehicle for banks to make the kind of risky 
loans described in the subsection on banks. Although these firms thus provide a 
rationale for the existence of capital regulation, as mentioned, I will usually focus 
on the case that the capital requirement is sufficiently high, according to condition 
(10), to prevent banks from engaging in excessive risk taking. These risky firms 
will then not exist in equilibrium. For this reason analysis of these firms is left for 
appendix A. Here I simply state the assumptions regarding the risky technology.  
  Risky firms differ in that their output is subject to an additive shock that is 
proportional to their capital stock: output is  ( , ) RF FKH K σ ε + , where ε is the 
same negative mean shock as defined in (4) and σRF is a parameter ( RF σ σ ≥ ). 
The choice of technology (i.e. the type of firm) is observable to all parties to a 
financial contract with the firm, so there is no asymmetric information. It is 
straightforward to verify that no household is willing to provide the risky firm 
with equity. The appendix shows how the optimal loan contract with such a firm 
gives banks the ability to create a risky loan portfolio as described in the 
subsection on banks. A loan portfolio with riskiness σ is created by directing a 
fraction / RF σ σ  of lending to risky firms with perfectly correlated shocks (e.g. by 
lending to one risky firm). 
 
Government: The government manages the deposit insurance fund, sets a capital 
requirement  [0,1) γ ∈  and conducts bank supervision. Bank supervision is 
necessary to enforce the capital requirement. A second role for bank supervision 
is to control excessive risk taking by banks. Supervisors can to some degree detect 
such behavior and stop any bank that is ‘caught’ attempting to take on excessive 
risk in order to protect the deposit insurance fund. It seems reasonable to assume 
that a small amount of risk taking is harder to detect than a large amount. The 
largest level of risk-taking that is still just undetectable is σ . σ  is assumed to be 
a decreasing function of the resources devoted to bank supervision: 
 
() ST σ =   with   () 0 S′ ≤ i  and 0 RF S σ < ≤   
 
where T, a choice variable for the government, is the part of tax revenue spent on 
bank supervision.
19 The interpretation is that, as more resources are devoted to 
                                                 
19 As in the standard growth model with government spending and lump sum taxes, if T is set ‘too 
high’, no equilibrium with positive consumption will exist. I assume that T is sufficiently low so 
  13bank supervision, banks are less able to engage in excessive risk taking without 
being detected. 
  The government has a balanced budget. Lump-sum taxes are set at  
 
  ( ) 0.5 ( (1 2 ))
DL
tt t t t TT R D R L σξ t
+
=+ − − + . (13) 
 
The second term represents the cost reimbursing depositors of failed banks under 
the deposit insurance scheme.  0 t σ =  or  t σ σ =  depending on the banks’ choice.  




  Given a government policy γ and T, an equilibrium is defined as a path of 
consumption, capital, deposits, equity holdings, bank loans and financial returns, 
for t = 0,1,2,… such that: 
1.  Households, banks and nonfinancial firms all solve their maximization 
problems, described above, with taxes set according to (13); 
















1 (, 1 ) ( 1 ) tt t t t t FK K K c K T σ ξδ + −+ − = + + ; 
 
I focus on the case that (10) holds:  ()
E
t ST R γ ≤ . Government policy can 
accomplish this by setting γ and/or T sufficiently high. In that case,  0 t σ =  and 
. Combining the market clearing conditions and equations (2), (3), (8), (9), 
(11), and (12), it is possible to characterize the equilibrium in terms of a system in 
(K
t TT =
t, ct) with 
E
t R  and dt as auxiliary variables, by distinguishing two cases, 
depending on whether the capital requirement binds in period t: 
 
Case 1: If  ( ,(1 ) ) 0 dt t uc K γ −= , the capital requirement is not binding and 
 
                                                                                                                                     
that a steady state equilibrium with positive consumption exists. Appendix B makes precise what 
‘sufficiently low’ means for particular functional form of the utility function. 
  14   
1
11 (( , ) /(,) )
E
ct t ct t t uc d ucd R β
−
−− =
  (, 1 )1
E
K t FK R δ +− =t  (14) 
 (1 ) tt dK γ ≤−  and  ( , ) 0 dtt ucd=  





Remark: this requires that demand for liquidity be satiated at d = (1 – γ)Kt. dt and 
et are not determined except in that dt ≤ (1– γ)Kt and et = Kt – dt.  Lt = Kt and 
LD
tt R RR == . The real wage is determined through (11) with Ht = 1. Note that 
with  ,   does not depend on d ( , ) 0 dtt ucd= ( , ) ct t ucd t.   
 
Case 2: If  ( ,(1 ) ) 0 dt t uc K γ −> , the capital requirement is binding and 
 
   
1
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+− = − +
=− −
 (15) 
 (1 ) tt dK γ =−  
  1 (, 1 )( 1 ) tt t t KF K K c T δ + =+ − − −  
 
Remark: Lt = Kt and remaining variables are determined through (3), (9) and (11) 
with Ht = 1. 
 
  In the first case, the capital requirement is nonbinding, because the level of 
deposits is such that the marginal value of liquidity provision is zero, which 
implies that their rate of return is no different from equity: 
D E
tt R R = . Except for 
the lump sum taxes, there is no material difference here with a standard growth 
model. Banks channel funds from households to firms, but they do not really 
matter at the margin, since their special ability to create liquidity has no marginal 
value (
LE
tt R R = ). 
  In the second case, the pecuniary return on deposits is lower than the 
return on equity by a spread equal to  (, ) (, ) dtt ctt ucd ucd, which is the marginal 
value of deposits’ liquidity services expressed in units of consumption. The 
capital requirement is now binding, since banks want to fund their assets as much 
as possible with the cheaper deposits. Because banking is characterized by perfect 
  15competition, banks fully pass on the lower cost of funding their loans to their 
borrowers, firms. However, since banks still have to finance a fraction γ of their 
lending with equity, the loan rate declines only by (1 )( ( , ) ( , )) dtt ctt ucd ucd γ − .  
 
A steady state result: No superneutrality 
  
  Because banks pass on the low pecuniary return on deposits to their 
borrowers, the steady state level of the capital stock is not generally invariant to 
capital adequacy regulation. This contrasts with the superneutrality result of the 
Sidrauski (1967) model.
20 In the present model, raising γ  can increase or lower 
the steady state capital stock, depending on the interest elasticity of liquidity 
demand. For example, suppose that 
 
  ( ) ( ) (, ) , ucd u cd φ =     and   () { }
/( 1) (1 ) / (1 ) / , cd c a d
ηη ηη ηη φ
− −− =+  
 

















so that demand for deposits is given by 
 
   ()
ED
tt t t da c RR
η η − =− . 
 
Hence,  η has the interpretation of the interest elasticity of the demand for 
deposits. It is straightforward to show that for this specification, the steady state 
level of the capital stock, K*, is increasing (decreasing) in γ if 01 η < <  ( 1 η > ). 
A proof can be found in Appendix B.
21  
The intuition for this result is as follows. Firms set the marginal product of 
capital equal to the rate on bank loans, which in turn equals 
 
 (1 )( )
LE ED R RR γ =− − − R
                                                
. 
 
20 In the Sidrauski model, the rate of inflation (which is what determines the rate of return on 
monetary assets) has no impact on the steady state capital stock. The reason is that in that model 
money is created by a monopolistic entity, the government, which does not in any way use the 
revenues from liquidity creation (seignorage) to lower the marginal cost of funding investment. 
21 The proof in Appendix B makes explicit the assumption that taxes T are sufficiently low to 
guarantee the existence of a steady state equilibrium with positive consumption. See footnote 19. 
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(cf. (9)). In steady state, 
1 E R β
− = . An increase in γ has two effects on R
L: one is 
to force banks to rely more on equity finance, which is more expensive than 




L. The second effect is a general equilibrium feedback. The fact that 
bank must rely less on deposits makes them more scarce to households, which 
increases the spread 
ED R R − . This second effect lowers the competitive rate on 
bank loans. If the interest elasticity of the demand for deposits is low (01 η << ), 
a large increase in the spread will be necessary to convince households to make 
do with fewer deposits, and the second effect will dominate. In that case, R
L falls 
and the steady state level of capital thus rises, otherwise not.  
  A related point is that the steady state level of the capital stock depends on 
the strength of the preference for liquidity. Without any preference for liquidity, 
equity, deposits and bank loans all command the same return, equal to 
1 β
−  in 
steady state. In the above example, this occurs when a = 0. On the other hand, if 
liquidity has value (a > 0 in the example), the steady state return on equity will 
still be 
1 β
− , but the return on deposits, and therefore the return on bank loans, 
will be strictly lower than that. Since firms equate the marginal product of capital 
to the rate on bank loans, it follows that the steady state capital stock is higher 
when households exhibit a preference for liquidity.  
 
 
2. The welfare cost of the capital requirement: a first-order 
approximation 
 
   The strategy for quantifying the welfare cost of the capital requirement is 
as follows. First, I present the constrained social planner’s problem to the model. 
The qualification ‘constrained’ means that the social planner’s problem shall 
respect the capital requirement and devote the same level of resources to 
supervision. This will ensure that the allocation that solves the social planner’s 
problem is incentive compatible for the banks. I then show that the allocation 
associated with the social planner’s problem is identical to the allocation of the 
decentralized equilibrium described above. Finally, I use this equivalence to 
derive analytically a first-order approximation of the welfare cost of increasing 
the capital requirement γ.  
 
  17The social planner’s problem 
 
Define the following constrained social planner’s problem: 
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where  0 (, ,, , ) TK θ γδ β = . The first constraint is the social resource constraint for 
σ  = 0;
22 the second constraint rewrites the capital requirement. The Lagrangian 
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In addition, since   by concavity of u, the first order condition with 
respect to deposits, combined with the complementary slackness conditions 
( , ) 0 dd uc d ≤
(1 ) tt γ ≤− 0
sp
t χ ≥ ,   and  ((1 ) ) 0
sp
tt t Kd χγ − −= , implies : 
 
  if   ( ,(1 ) ) 0  then   (1 ) , with   ( , ) 0 dt t t t dtt uc K d K ucd γ γ −= ≤ − = ; (18) 
  if   ( ,(1 ) ) 0  then   (1 ) dt t t t uc K d K γ γ −> = −  (19) 
 
                                                 
22 The absence of excessive risk taking is simply part of the definition of the constrained social 
planner’s problem.  
  18Combining equations (17), (18) and (19) with the social resource constraint (the 
first constraint to the problem in (16)), it is apparent that the allocations of  Kt, ct 
and dt are identical to those of the decentralized equilibrium summarized above in 
the systems of equations (14) and (15). Equation (18) corresponds to an 
equilibrium with a nonbinding capital requirement (‘case 1’, system  (14)), while 
equation (19) corresponds to the case of a binding capital requirement (‘case 2’, 
system (15)).  
 Hence,  the constrained social planner’s problem replicates the 
decentralized equilibrium when σ = 0 in the decentralized equilibrium. As a 
result, if σ = 0, welfare in the decentralized equilibrium is equal to  0() V θ , the 
value of the objective function to the constrained social planner’s problem. 
 
A formula for the marginal welfare cost 
 
  The equivalence of the constrained social planner’s problem and the 
decentralized equilibrium can be used to measure the marginal effect on welfare 
of a change in the capital requirement in the following way. Call the current 
period period 0. Assume government policy is such that (10) holds:  ()
E
t ST R γ ≤  
for all  , so that  0 t ≥ 0 t σ =  in the decentralized equilibrium. That is, the capital 
requirement is sufficiently high to be successful in preventing excessive risk 
taking. Starting from this situation, I compute the marginal effect on welfare of 


















== − = −
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t K  
 
The last equality follows from the first order condition (d) to the social planner’s 
problem. Since the allocations of Kt, ct and dt are identical to those of the 
decentralized equilibrium, I can use the decentralized equilibrium values for the 
variables on the right hand side of this equation. Moreover, in the decentralized 
equilibrium, we have, using (3), 
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  19where the last equality follows from the fact that  (1 ) t d t K γ = −  if the capital 
requirement binds, and  that ()
ED
tt RR 0 − =  if it does not bind. 
I compare this to the welfare effect of a permanent change in consumption 
by a factor (1 ) ν + . Starting from the initial equilibrium, the effect on welfare of 
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Next, let’s assume that the economy is in steady state in period 0. Then the first 
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⎟  (20) 
 
if period 0 is a steady state. Equating the right hand sides of these last two 
equations, we have the following result.
23
 
PROPOSITION 1: Assume the economy is in steady state in period 0 and (10) holds. 
Consider permanently increasing γ  by  γ ∆ . A first-order approximation to the 
resulting welfare loss, expressed as the welfare-equivalent permanent relative loss 











− ∆= − − ∆ γ γ




23 Equate the right hand sides of these two equations to solve for ν. With  0 γ ∆ > , the result is a 
negative value for ν  which, to a first-order approximation, consumers would be equally unhappy 
to experience as a rise in the capital requirement by  γ ∆ .  () ν γ ∆  in the proposition is the absolute 
value of this negative value, which is thus the first-order approximate welfare-equivalent relative 
loss in consumption associated with  γ ∆ . 
  20  The above formula is, at least in principle, empirically implementable. 
Remarkably, it does not rely on any assumptions about the functional form of 
preferences, beyond the standard assumptions of monotinicity, differentiability 
and concavity. Instead, the formula relies on asset returns to reveal the 
representative household’s preference for liquidity relative to consumption. An 
unnecessary increase in the capital requirement reduces welfare by reducing the 
ability of banks to issue deposit-type liabilities for any given level of bank assets.  
  The first factor in the formula for the welfare loss concerns the importance 
of deposits in the economy. The second is the spread between the return on bank 
equity and the pecuniary return to deposits. This spread equals the amount of 
consumption households are willing to forgo in order to enjoy the liquidity 
services of one additional unit of deposits. Finally, 
1 (1 ) γ γ
− − ∆  is the relative 
change in deposits as a result of changing the capital requirement for a given level 
of bank assets. 
  Note that, while the proposition assumes that the economy is initially in 
steady state, the welfare loss takes into account, to a first-order approximation, all 
the gains or losses associated with the transition to a new steady state upon 
changing the capital requirement.  
It may still seem surprising that no assumptions were needed on functional 
form the utility function. After all, to use the Sidrauski model to measure the 
welfare cost of inflation, as in Lucas (2000), one does need to specify the 
functional form of the utility function. The difference is that, while money in the 
Sidrauski model is created by a nonoptimizing monopolist (the government), in 
this model the supply of liquidity is created by competitive banks. This additional 
structure in the model means we have some information on how the quantity of 
deposits will change as we change the capital requirement. In contrast, in the 
Sidrauski model, to know the change in real balances in response to a change in 
inflation, one needs to know the interest elasticity of money demand, which 
amounts to requiring more knowledge of the utility function. 
 
 
3. Measurement of the welfare cost 
 
  The main result so far is an expression for the welfare cost of a bank 
capital requirement. The expression lends itself to a calculation of this cost based 
on data. The data used here are annual aggregate balance sheet and income 
  21statement data for all FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks in the United States (50 
states and DC), obtained from the FDIC’s Historical Statistics on Banking 
(HSOB). These data are based on regulatory filings.  
In mapping the theory to the data, some choices need to be made. For 
deposits,  D  , the HSOB’s Total Deposits is used. ( d = )
                                                
24 The net return on 
deposits   is calculated as Interest on Total Deposits divided by Total 
Deposits. For consumption, c, I use personal consumption expenditures from the 




25 This is computed as Total Equity Capital plus Subordinated Notes 
divided by Total Assets. Subordinated Notes are included because subordinated 
debt counts, within certain limits, towards regulatory tier 2 capital. Total Equity 
Capital plus Subordinated Notes does not exactly correspond to total capital in the 
sense of the Basle Accord, on which current capital adequacy regulation in the US 
(and many other countries) is based. However, data on total capital in the sense of 
the Basle Accord is only available starting in 1996 and it seems more important to 
be able to use a longer time span, especially since the formula for the marginal 
welfare cost in (21) is not very sensitive to the measurement of γ.  
An alternative would have been to use the actual regulatory numbers for 
the capital requirement (either 0.08 for total capital based on the Basle Accord or 
0.10 based on the FDICIA, the CAMELS ratings and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act). However, both the data and theory
26 suggest that the vast majority of banks 
hold a buffer of equity above the regulatory minimum so as to lower the risk of an 
adverse shock leading to capital inadequacy. Since the model abstracts from this 
buffer stock behavior by assuming away any shocks, one would want to include 
this buffer in the measurement of γ as it is due to the capital adequacy regulation 
in the first place.
27 There is little reason to expect the buffer itself would change 
dramatically in response to a change in the regulatory minimum capital ratio. In 
any case, as mentioned, the point is not quantitatively very important. For 
example, as we change the measure of γ from an unreasonably low value, say, 
0.04 to an unreasonably high value, say 0.15, holding constant the other 
 
24 All variables are nominal. While the model is real, using nominal data is fine, as long as all data 
are nominal, because the formula for the welfare cost in (21) contains only ratios of quantities and 
spreads of returns. 
25 This may seem incorrect if the capital requirement is not binding. However, if that is the case, 
the model implies that R
E = R
D, so the welfare cost is zero regardless of how γ is measured. 
26 See Van den Heuvel (2004) for a quantitative model. 
27 In addition these ratios apply to risk weighted assets and off-balance sheet items, considerations 
from which the model also abstracts. 
  22measurements, the estimated marginal welfare cost increases only by a factor 1.13 
( ). 
11 (1 0.15) /(1 0.04)
−− =− −
Finally, a measure of the required return on (bank) equity is needed. Since 
the model abstracts from aggregate risk, a risk-adjusted measure is needed. To 
avoid the difficulties inherent in measuring the (ex ante) risk premium on regular 
equity,
28 the measure I use is the average return on subordinated bank debt. The 
reason for this choice is that (a) subordinated debt counts towards regulatory 
equity capital, albeit within certain limits, and (b) defaults on this type of debt 
have historically been very rare, so the debt is not very risky. As a measure for 
, the net return on subordinated debt is calculated as Interest on 
Subordinated Notes and Debentures divided by Subordinated Notes and 
Debentures.
(
E R −1 )
                                                
29  
The limits on the use of subordinated debt for regulatory purposes imply 
that this is a conservative measure for the risk-adjusted required return on bank 
equity. First, because it is regarded as an inferior form of equity, subordinated 
debt can count only towards tier 2 capital. Second, and more importantly, the 
amount of subordinated debt is limited to 50 percent of the bank’s tier 1 capital. 
What this means is that if the tier 1 capital ratio is close to binding, subordinated 
debt can count for at most approximately 25 percent of total capital. Since banks 
may use subordinated debt to meet their capital requirements only up to these 
limits (and they do not have to use it), it is possible that for many banks the 
required return on subordinated debt is lower than the risk-adjusted return on 
regular equity.  
  To measure the welfare cost using the derived formula I compute long run 
averages for the deposit consumption ratio, for the spread between the return on 
subordinated debt and deposits, and for the capital asset ratio. The Basle Accord 
and the FDIC Improvement Act enacting it were not fully implemented until 
January 1, 1993. For this reason, the sample period is set at 1993-2002. Using 
 
28 For example, the historical average excess return on bank equity would imply a high premium, 
but does this equal the ex ante expected premium? In addition, depending on what interest rate is 
used to measure the excess return on equity, this approach runs the risk of contaminating the 
measured risk premium with a liquidity premium, which one would definitely want to avoid in the 
present context. If on the other hand one takes a model based measure of the ex ante risk premium 
based on ‘reasonable’ preferences, one would likely get a much lower measure. (This is the well 
known equity premium puzzle.) 
29 A part of what is counted in the HSOB as Subordinated Debt and Debentures does not qualify as 
regulatory tier 2 capital (e.g. if the maturity is too short). However, cross-checking with the 
Reports on Condition and Income (‘call reports’) item RCFD5610 indicates that the difference is 
minimal after 1992. 
  231986-2002 as a longer sample yields very similar results. (1986 is the first year 
that regulation Q is fully phased out.)  
  For 1993-2002 the mean deposit to consumption ratio is 0.61, the average 
net returns on deposits and subordinated debts are, respectively, 3.08% and 
6.26%, so the average spread is 3.18%, and the mean capital asset ratio is 0.096. 
Hence, applying (21), a first order approximation to the welfare cost of raising the 
capital requirement by  γ ∆  is: 
 
 
1 ( ) 0.61 0.0318 (1 0.096) 0.0216 ν γγ
− ∆= × ×− ∆ = ∆ γ  
 
To interpret this number, suppose that new regulation increases γ by 0.1 
(approximately a doubling of the effective capital requirement) without any 
change in bank supervision. The resulting welfare loss is equivalent to a 
permanent loss in consumption of  (0.1) 0.0216 0.1 100% 0.216% ν = ×× = . This is 
not, in my view, a trivial welfare cost. Some well-known estimates on the welfare 
costs of business cycles or the welfare gains of implementing the optimal 
monetary policy rule (taking as given average inflation) are much smaller. 
One objection one might have to the above calculation of the welfare cost 
is that it does not take into account resource costs that banks incur in servicing 
deposits or making loans. The former include the costs of ATM networks, part of 
the cost of maintaining a network of branches, etc. The latter include the costs of 
screening loan applications, collecting payments, as well as part of the cost of 
maintaining a branch network. These costs are not trivial. For the period 1993-
2002 net noninterest cost of U.S. banks have averaged 1.29% of total assets. The 
next section will address this concern by incorporating into the model resource 
costs associated with accepting deposits and/or making loans. 
 
 
4. Costly financial intermediation 
 
  This section extends the model to allow for resource costs associated with 
servicing deposits and/or making loans. More precisely, it is now assumed that a 
bank with D in deposits and L in loans pays a cost g(D,L) to service those 
financial contracts. The cost enters negatively in the calculation of the bank’s net 
cash flow.  
  24I make the following assumptions on g:  g(D,L) is nonnegative, twice 
continuously differentiable, increasing in its first argument, strictly increasing in 
its second argument, convex, and homogenous of degree 1, i.e. it exhibits constant 
returns to scale. Note that linear costs are included as a special case. 
  For the rest, the model is the same as presented in section 1. It is, however, 
convenient to impose the following additional assumption on the utility function: 
 
0













 for all c > 0  (22) 
 
This ‘weak Inada’ condition
30 is imposed only to streamline the analysis of the 
equilibrium. If it fails to hold, there is an additional –empirically irrelevant– case 
to consider in which banks do not exist in equilibrium because the cost of 
intermediation is too high relative to the marginal value of liquidity, regardless of 
how scarce liquidity is. If that case applies, the model in any case closely 
resembles a standard growth model.
31 The above assumption is sufficient, but not 
necessary, to rule out this empirically uninteresting case. 
  The introduction of the cost of intermediation has a direct effect only on 
the bank’s decision problem. The rest of this section analyses the bank’s decisions 
in the presence of g, and then moves on to describe how the equilibrium changes. 
 
Banks under costly financial intermediation 
 
With costly intermediation, the bank’s cash flow is equal to 
() (
LD , ) R LR Dg D L σε +−− . The value of the bank to its shareholders right after 






















                                                
 (23) 
 
The only difference with (5) is the presence of the resource cost  .  (,) gDL
 
30   is a sufficient condition for the assumption to hold. 
0





31 Obviously, without banks, the welfare cost of increasing the bank capital requirement would be 
zero in this case. 
  25  First, a similar argument as in section 1 can be used to characterize the 
choice of σ conditional on L and D. As before, the optimal solution entails either 
zero or maximum riskiness. Appendix C shows that the following is a sufficient 
condition for  0 σ = :  
 
(1 ) (1 ,1)
LD RR g σ γ ≤− − −− γ  (24) 
 
This is also a necessary condition when the capital requirement is binding. From 
the remainder of this section, unless explicitly stated otherwise, it is assumed that 
(24) holds.  
 Again,  with  0 σ =  the bank’s sub-problem in (23) is simplified. Since the 
algebra is fairly similar to that in section 1, the details are left to Appendix C. The 
appendix also contains an analysis of the bank’s full problem, in which the bank 
also chooses how much equity to raise with the goal of maximizing its pre-issue 
value,  . The result of that exercise can be conveniently summarized by 
stating the following versions of the first order conditions: 
( )
B VE E −
 




D R Rg D L =+   
  (,)
LE
L R Rg D L =+   
 
2. If the capital requirement binds, then EL γ =  and 
 
  (1 ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , )
LE D




In either case,  .  ( )
B VE E =
 
  The first case, a nonbinding capital requirement, requires that the bank be 
indifferent at the margin between financing its assets with deposits or equity and 
that the bank makes zero profit on making one more loan and financing it with 
equity (or deposits). The second requirement entails 
L R R > , since   
by assumption. However, if 
( , ) 0 L gD L >
LE R R > , nonfinancial firms will strictly prefer 
equity finance to bank loans, as explained in the discussion of firms in section 1. 
There will be no demand for loans in that case,
32 and banks will not exist. Hence, 
                                                 
32 Technically, the demand for bank loans would be negative infinity. That is why R
L ≤ R
E is a 
requirement for a finite solution to the firm’s problem. See section 2. 
  26if banks exist in equilibrium, with costly financial intermediation, the capital 
requirement always binds.  
  With the capital requirement binding, equation (25) holds. Since 
(1 ) D L γ =−  in this case, and using the fact that the partial derivatives of g are 
homogenous of degree zero as well as Euler’s theorem, this is easily simplified to 
 
 (1 ) (1 ,1)
LE D RR R g γ γ =+ − + − γ  (26) 
 
Under costless financial intermediation, the rate on bank loans was simply equal 
to the appropriately weighted average of the returns on equity and deposits. Now, 
the return on bank loans also includes the term  (1 ,1) g γ −  - the resource cost of 
lending one additional unit and servicing 1 γ −  additional units of deposits to 
finance the loan. As constant returns to scale of g implies that the marginal cost of 
increasing the scale equals the average cost, the bank still has zero profits: 
.   ()
B VE E =
  Note that the condition for σ = 0, stated in (24), is seen to be equivalent to 
 
 
E R σ γ ≤ ,  
 
the same condition as with g = 0 (condition (10)). Since the capital requirement is 




As mentioned, the cost of intermediation has a direct effect only on the 
bank’s decision problem. Nonetheless, a few comments on the decisions of 
nonfinancial firms and on the government are in order. For households, the 
analysis is exactly the same as before. 
  For nonfinancial firms, it has been shown that when 
LE R R = , firms are 
indifferent between equity and bank loans.  In section 1 it was possible to assume 
without loss of generality that in that case firms opt for bank loans only. As will 
be clear shortly, with costly financial intermediation, such an assumption would 
now no longer be correct, so this assumption is dropped.  
  For the government, the budget constraint needs restating to take into 
account the effect of the cost of intermediation on the losses, if any, of the deposit 
insurance fund: 
 
  27( ) 0.5 ( (1 2 )) ( , )
DL
tt t t t t t TT R D R Lg D L σξ t
+
=+ − − + −  (27) 
 
 
General equilibrium with costly intermediation 
 
  The definition of equilibrium is essentially the same as in section 1. 
However, since it will turn out to be necessary to explicitly consider the 
possibility that firm equity is strictly positive ( ), the market clearing 
conditions are modified to take this into account. 
0
F E >
  Given a government policy γ and T, an equilibrium with costly 
intermediation is defined as a path of consumption, capital, deposits, equity 
holdings, bank loans and financial returns, for t = 0,1,2,… such that: 
1.  Households, banks and nonfinancial firms all solve their maximization 
problems, described above, with taxes set according to (27); 



















1 (, 1 ) ( 1 ) (,) tt t t t t t t FK K K c K gDL T σ ξδ + −+ − = + + + ; 
 
Again, I focus on the case that (10) holds:  ()
E
t ST R γ ≤ , so that  0 t σ =  and  . 
Combining the market clearing conditions with equations (2), (3), (26), (11) and 





t R , 
L
t R  and dt as auxiliary variables:  
 
11 11 ( ,1) (1 ) (1 ,1) /(1 ) tt t t t KF K K c g d T δ γγ −− −− =+ − − − − − −  (28) 
1
11 (( , ) /(,) )
E
ct t ct t t uc d ucd R β
−
−− =  (29) 
(, 1 )1
L
K t FK R δ +− =t  (30) 
 
where dt and the relation between 
L
t R  and 
E
t R  are determined according to one of 
the following two cases. Let 
(, ( 1 ) )
(1 ) (1 ,1)















  28(a) If  , firms rely solely on bank loans and  0 ∆≥
 
(1 ) t d t K γ =−  (31) 
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tt R R ≤ ,   and  t LK = t 0
F
t E = . Remaining variables are determined 
through (3) and (11)  with Ht = 1. 
 

















t R R =  (34) 
 
Remark: /(1 ) tt Ld K t γ =− <  and  0
F
tt t EK L = −> . Remaining variables are 
determined through (3) and (11) with Ht = 1. Assumption (22) guarantees that 
there exists a   between 0 and ( t d 1 ) t K γ −  such that (33) holds. 
 
  Thus, the spread between the required return on equity and the rate on 
bank loans is reduced by the cost of financial intermediation. However, if the cost 
of banking is sufficiently small relative to the value of liquidity services, bank 
loans are still strictly cheaper than equity finance and the equilibrium is 
qualitatively similar to the one with costless intermediation (and a binding capital 
requirement).  
In contrast, if the cost of banking is high, in the sense that  , then 
firms will use both equity and bank finance, in such proportion that, in 





t R R = . This is consistent with zero 
profits in banking only if (1 ) γ −  times the spread between 
E
t R  and 
D
t R  exactly 
compensates for the resource cost of lending one unit and servicing (1 ) γ −  units 
of deposits, whence equation (33).
33 This condition determines the equilibrium 
volume of deposits. As  /(1 ) tt Ld γ =−  with the binding capital requirement, it 
also pins down the right proportion between equity and bank finance,  
  It is interesting to note that in case (b) steady state superneutrality of the 
capital requirement γ holds, in contrast to the result under costless financial 
                                                 
33 The capital requirement still binds because  (1 ,1) /(1 ) (1 ,1)
ED
tt D RRg g γ γ −=− − > − γ , so the 
spread exceeds the marginal resource cost of deposits. 




t R R =  in case (b) and the latter is simply 
1 β
−  
in steady state; this pins down the steady state capital stock through (30), which is 
then no different from the steady state capital stock obtained without any 
preference for liquidity (i.e. if  0 d u ≡ ). In case (a), however, it is easy to verify 
that superneutrality fails for general u( ) as in section 1.  
In either case, though, I will show that welfare is affected by the capital 
requirement. The strategy for doing so is the same as in section 2. I present a 
constrained social planner’s problem that replicates the decentralized equilibrium 
and then use that equivalence to derive a new formula for the marginal welfare 
cost of increasing γ. 
 
The social planner’s problem with costly intermediation 
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Recall that  0 (, ,, , ) TK θ γδ β = . This problem differs from the one in section 2 not 
only by including the intermediation cost g, but also by allowing for the 
possibility that  .   0
F
tt t EK L =− >
  Appendix D displays the first-order conditions to this problem and uses 
these to characterize the solution. It also shows that the resulting allocation is 
identical to the decentralized equilibrium with costly intermediation when σ = 0 
in that equilibrium (i.e. when  ()
E
t ST R γ ≤ ). In other words, the constrained social 
planner’s problem replicates the decentralized equilibrium and, as a consequence, 
welfare in the decentralized equilibrium equals  0 ()
ci V θ , the value of the objective 
function to the constrained social planner’s problem with costly intermediation. 
 
A formula for the marginal welfare cost for the case of costly intermediation 
 
  Again, the strategy is to exploit the equivalence of the constrained social 
planner’s problem and the decentralized equilibrium to measure the marginal 
  30effect on welfare of a change in the capital requirement. Call the current period 
period 0 and assume government policy is such that (10) holds:  ()
E
t ST R γ ≤  for 
all  , so that  0 t ≥ 0 t σ =  in the decentralized equilibrium. The marginal effect on 

























t χ  is the Kuhn Tucker multiplier on the capital requirement. Using the 
first order conditions (d) and (c) to the social planner’s problem (shown in 
Appendix D),  
 
() (, ) (, ) (, )
sp
tt dtt c ttDtt t L ucd ucdgdL L χ =−  
 
Since the allocations of Kt, ct and dt are identical to those of the decentralized 
equilibrium, I can use the decentralized equilibrium values for the variables on the 
right hand side of this equation. Moreover, in the decentralized equilibrium, we 
have, using (3), 
 
() ( )
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ED
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where I have also used the result that the capital requirement binds, so that 
(1 ) tt dL γ =− . 
Next, assume that the economy is in steady state in period 0. Then the first 
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Again, it is useful to compare this to the welfare effect of a permanent change in 
consumption by a factor (1 ) ν + , given to a first order approximation in equation 
(20) if period 0 is a steady state. The result is the following 
 
  31PROPOSITION 2: Assume the economy is in steady state in period 0 and (10) holds. 
Consider permanently increasing γ  by  γ ∆ . With costly financial intermediation, 
a first-order approximation to the resulting welfare loss, expressed as the welfare-













− ∆= − − − ∆ γ γ  (35) 
 
  This formula differs from the one derived for costless intermediation in 
that it subtracts the marginal resource cost of servicing deposit contracts from the 
spread between the returns on equity and deposits.
34 The intuition for this change 
is straightforward: If liquidity creation is costly, then, even in the absence of a 
binding capital requirement, this creates a spread between the returns on equity 
and deposits, as banks need to be compensated for this cost. It is only to the extent 
that the spread exceeds the marginal resource cost of the deposits that a scarcity of 
deposits due to the binding capital requirement is revealed. Only then is there a 
welfare effect at the margin.  
It is worth emphasizing that the formula is valid whether the equilibrium is 
characterized by pure bank finance or by mixed bank and equity finance. How 
one might measure, or bound, the marginal cost of deposits is addressed in the 
next section.  
 
 
5. Further Empirical Results 
 
Arguably the most conservative way of measuring the new term, 
, in the expression for the welfare cost (35) is to calculate an upper and 
lower bound based only on the assumptions already made, namely that the cost g 
is nondecreasing and exhibits constant returns to scale, which imply











                                                 
34 Note that if g = 0, the formula specializes to the one derived in proposition 1. Thus, the formula 
applies in both cases.  
35 With decreasing returns to scale these bounds would also apply. The assumption that gL > 0 
actually implies that the second inequality is strict. 
  32Setting   yields the same result as with costless financial intermediation. 
Section 3 found that  
0 D g =
( ) 0.0216 ν γ ∆= ∆ γ  in this case. To implement the upper 
bound,  g is measured as net noninterest cost (Total Noninterest Expense minus 
Total Noninterest Income). The average ratio of net noninterest cost to deposits 
for 1993-2002 is 0.0187 (i.e. 1.87 percent). With this upper bound for  D g  we get 
the following lower bound for the welfare cost: 
 
 
1 ( ) 0.61 (0.0318 0.0187) (1 0.096) 0.0089
ci ν γγ
− ∆≥ × − ×− ∆ = ∆ γ  
 
Naturally, recognizing that financial intermediation is costly leads to a somewhat 
lower estimate of the marginal welfare cost. According to this method, the welfare 
loss of raising the capital requirement by  0.1 γ ∆ =  is somewhere between 0.89% 
and 2.16% of consumption (permanently). [Note: alternative, less conservative 
estimates are to be added.] 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The welfare costs of bank capital requirements found in this paper are 
neither trivial nor gigantic. One interpretation of this finding is that regulators 
face an important trade-off between, on the one hand, keeping the effective capital 
requirement ratio as low as possible and, on the other hand, limiting the 
supervision and compliance cost associated with capital adequacy regulation, all 
the while keeping the probability of bank failure acceptably low. It is not obvious 
that the current trend towards a more complex regulatory regime is outrageously 
wrong. 
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Since there is no asymmetric information between the bank and the firm, the 
optimal financial contract will have the repayment depend on the realization of 
the shock ε. Let ( )
L R ε    denote the contractual loan repayment rate as a function 
of the shock. Profits are of a risky firm are: 
 
  (, ) ( 1 ) ( )
FL
RF FKH K K w H R K π σε δ ε =+ + − − −      
 
For ease of exposition define  
 
() m a x(,)( 1 )
H f KF K H K w H δ ≡+ − −  
 
One of the results in the main text is that, in an equilibrium in which riskless firms 
exist, they have zero profits and indeterminate scale, so that 
 
 ()
L f KR K =  
 
where R
L is the equilibrium riskless loan rate. Hence, given an optimal choice for 




RF R KK R K π σε ε =+ −      
 
Limited liability of the shareholders implies   in each state. Hence,  0
F π ≥  
  
   ()
LL
RF RR ε σε ≤+    
 
The right hand side is the most the bank can charge in each state without violating 
limited liability. Suppose the loan rate equals this upper bound in each state. 
Then, from assumption (4), it follows that 
 
  [( ) ]
LL
RF
L R RR ε εξ σ =− <   E  
 
Since this is still a worse expected return than for a nonrisky loan, the risky firm 
cannot hope to get better terms, so that, in fact,  ()
LL
RF RR ε σε =+   , if any lending 
to risky firms occurs.  
With this loan contract, the risky firm has zero (expected) profits, so its 
participation constraint is satisfied. As mentioned in the main text, this implies 
that a bank can create a portfolio of riskiness σ by directing a fraction  / RF σ σ  of 
its lending to risky firms with perfectly correlated shocks (e.g. one risky firm).   
Finally, it is easily verified that labor demand of a risky firm satisfies the 
same first-order condition (11) as for a nonrisky firm. 
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First, I state explicitly a convenient assumption that bounds taxes from 
above in order to guarantee existence of a steady state equilibrium with positive 




1 ˆ (, 1 )1 K FK δ β
− +− ≡ .   (36) 
 
Note that   exists and is unique.  is the steady state level of the capital stock 
under the assumption   (i.e. 
ˆ K ˆ K
0 a = (, ) 0 d uc d≡ , so that the model is not materially 
different from the standard growth model). I assume that 
 
ˆ (, 1 ) 1 H TF K <  (37) 
 
That is, taxes are lower than aggregate wage income at  . ˆ K
36  
 With  a > 0,  everywhere, so the capital stock is determined by 
system (15) which for a steady state and the assumed functional form of u( ) 
simplifies to 















+− = − − ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 and 
** * (, 1 ) FK K c T δ += +  
 
where starred variables denote steady state levels. Equivalently, 
 
*1 ( 1 ) / (, 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) () K FK a K
* 1 / η ηη δβ γ
−− +− = − − Ψ    (38)   
with 
  ()((, 1 ) ) / KF KT K δ Ψ≡ − −  
 
Since  , 
** * /( ) cK K =Ψ
** * 0( ) 0 [ , ] cK K K K ≥⇔ Ψ ≥⇔ ∈ , where  , KK are the 
two solutions to  (, 1 ) FK K T δ −= .
37  
Using assumption (37), the definition of   (36), and Euler’s theorem, it is 
straightforward to show that 
ˆ K
ˆ ()0 K Ψ > , so that  ˆ (,) KK K ∈ . Moreover, again 
using Euler’s theorem, 
 
 
2 ()( (, 1 ) ) H KT F K K ′ Ψ= −  
                                                 
36 Recall that H = 1 in equilibrium. The assumption is sufficient but not necessary. 
37 The two roots exist since  , as explained in the next paragraph, and because F satisfies 
the Inada conditions. 
ˆ () 0 K Ψ>
  35 
Define   by writing  K   (, 1 ) H FK T ≡   . Note that   exists and is unique,    by 
(37) and   iff 
K   ˆ KK <  
()( ) 0 K ′ Ψ> < ( ) KK < >   . The last fact also implies that KK >   . 
 Since  ˆ KKK <<   , as we let K increase from   to  K   K , the left-hand side 
of (38),  ( ,1) 1 K FK δ +− , drops, continuously and monotonically, from a value 
strictly greater than 
1 β
−  to a value strictly less than 
1 β
− .
38  Again, as we let K 
increase from   to  K   K , the right-hand side of (38), 
11 (1 ) ( ) aK
/ η βγ
− −− Ψ , rises, 
continuously and monotonically, from a value strictly less than 
1 β
−  to exactly 
1 β
−  (as  () 0 K Ψ≡ ). Hence, there is exactly one   in 
* K [,] KK    satisfying (38). By 
a similar argument it is easy to show that there is no   in 
* K [,) KK    satisfying (38). 
Hence, there is a unique steady state level of the capital stock. It is interesting to 
note that its marginal product is less than 
1 β
− , so  exceeds  , the steady state 
level of capital without liquidity preference. 
* K ˆ K
  Total differentiation of equation (38) with respect to   and γ  yields:  
* K
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1/ * 1/ *
*( 1 ) * ( 1 )
(1 )( 1) ()
(, 1 ) ( 1 ) () () KK
aK dK









′ +− Ψ Ψ
*  
 
* KK K <<    implies that 
* () 0 K Ψ >  and 
* () 0 K ′ Ψ < . Since, in addition, 
, 
* (, 1 ) 0 KK FK <
 
  ( )





                                                 
38 In fact, it is possible to show that  (, 1 )1 1 K FK δ + −<  by using the definition of K  and 
assumption (37). 
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Expected dividends are now 
 
() () ( , )
( ) ( , ) if  ( (1 2 )) ( , ) 0
     =




RL R D g D L
RL R D g D L R L R D g D L
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As before, expected dividends are a quasi-linear, convex function of σ, so the 
optimal choice of riskiness is at a boundary of the feasible set [0, ] σ . By 
evaluating expected dividends under σ = 0 versus σ σ = , and using the constant 
returns to scale of g, it is easy to verify that 
 
0  iff   ( / ) ( / ,1)
LD R RD L g D L σσ =≤ − −  
 otherwise σ σ =  
 
Again, for convenience it is assumed that the bank chooses σ = 0 when bank is 
indifferent between the two choices at  (/) (/ , 1 )
LD R RD L g D L σ =− − . Because 
ELD L γ =−≥ , a sufficient condition for  0 σ = is:  
 
(1 ) (1 ,1)




This is also a necessary condition if E γ = , i.e. if the capital requirement is 
binding.  
  If (24) holds, the bank’s sub-problem in (23) simplifies to: 
 
    () () m a x ( ) ( ,) /
s.t. 0
BL D
L VE R LRLE g LE L R
EL γ




where I have substituted the balance sheet identity, DLE = − , into the objective 
function. While this sub-problem is straightforward to solve, it economizes on 
algebra to characterize the solution as part of an analysis of the bank’s full 
problem, which includes the choice on how much equity to raise. In choosing E, 
the bank maximizes its pre-issue value,  ( )























The first-order conditions are: 
  37 
(L)  (,) (,)
LD E
DL R Rg D L g D L R γ χ −− − =  
(E)  (,) ( 1 )
D E
D R gD L R χ += −  
  
where χ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the capital requirement: 
0 χ ≥  and  () EL0 χ γ −= . There are two cases to consider: 





D R Rg D L =+   
  (,)
LE
L R Rg D L =+   
 
 If  0 χ > , i.e. if the capital requirement binds, EL γ =  and the first-order 
conditions yield 
 
  (1 ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , )
LE D






APPENDIX D.  THE CONSTRAINED SOCIAL PLANNER’S PROBLEM WITH COSTLY 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
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(c)   (,)
sp
ctt t ucd λ =  
(d)   (, ) (,)
sps
dtt t Dtt t uc d gdL
p λ χ =+  
(L)   (1 ) ( , )
sps p
tt L t t gdL
s p
t γ χλ µ −= +  
(K)  
1
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with  . Since g 0, [(1 ) ] 0, 0  and   [ ] 0
sp sp sp sp
tt t t t t t t Kd KL χχ γ µ µ ≥− − = ≥ − =
t L
L > 0, 
the first order conditions with respect to consumption and loans imply  , so 




(1 ) t d γ = − . There are thus only two cases 
to consider: 
 
(a). If  , then   and, since  ,  0
sp
t µ > t KL = t t K 0
sp
t χ > (1 ) (1 ) tt dL γ γ = −= −. 
Rewriting the first-order condition with respect to K, 
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where the last equality follows the first order conditions with respect to d and L 
and the homogeneity of g. Since the term in curly brackets equals  /
sps
tt
p µ λ , it 
must be strictly positive. As  (1 ) t d t K γ = −  here, this case thus requires that 
. (For convenience, it is recalled that    0 ∆>
(1 ) ( ,(1 ) ) ( ,(1 ) ) (1 ,1) dt t ct t uc K uc K g γ γγ ∆≡ − − − − −γ .) 
 






11 (, 1 ) 1 ( , ) ( ,) K tc t t FK uc d uc d δβ
−
−− +− = c t t  
 (, ) (, )( 1 , 1 ) / ( 1 ) dtt ctt uc d uc dg γ γ =− −  
 
The second equation is obtained by combining the first order conditions with 
respect to d and L. As case (a) requires  0 ∆ > , case (b) must apply if  . If 
, then by assumption (22) there exists a positive 
0 ∆≤
0 ∆≤ (1 ) t d t K γ ≤ −  satisfying 
this equation.  
 
Combining the above equations, including the social resource constraint 
and the binding capital requirement, it is apparent that the allocations of  Kt, ct and 
dt are identical to those of the decentralized equilibrium summarized above in 
equations (28) through (34). Case (a) corresponds to the case of pure bank finance 
(also termed ‘case (a)’ in the main text), while case (b) corresponds to firms 
relying on both equity and bank finance (again, same label in the main text). 
Hence,  this constrained social planner’s problem replicates the decentralized 
equilibrium  when  σ = 0 in the decentralized equilibrium and financial 
intermediation is costly.  
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